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150 years since Lenin’s birth marks an anniversary that raises questions around Lenin’s meaning 
today and his ultimate historical legacy. By distinguishing both Lenin the man, and the cult 
of  commemoration that for 60 years surrounded him, from the core method behind Lenin’s own 
thought, this article addresses the question of if and why Lenin still matters in Europe today. 
It does so by arguing for an Ilyenkovian reading of Lenin’s main ideas and contributions. The 
current condition of European politics is, to a significant degree, still a by-product of the rejection 
of ‘Leninism’ after 1989, Leninism having evolved after 1924 into a sociological construct 
designed predominantly to facilitate the accelerated industrialization of backward societies. 
The rejection of Leninism as an alternate form of modernity led, via a consciously post-modern 
moment in central and eastern Europe, to the substitution of ‘memory politics’, fostering a more 
openly competitive political culture focused around race, identity, religious faith, and often 
radical ethnic nationalism. The dangers of such an outcome were foreshadowed in the concerns 
of the Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov, who sought in the 1960s and 1970s to counterbalance 
the rise of neopositivist thinking in his era by revisiting the dialectics of the ideal first explored 
by Marx and Lenin. Whilst Ilyenkov saw mechanistic materialism as the greater latent danger in 
his own day, he also opposed the subjective idealism of ‘socialism with a human face’, and the 
idealist currents that arose in response to neopositivist rhetoric in Soviet social life. He found in 
Lenin an intellectual ally of his own belief that the true definition of the ideal emerges via the 
collaborative collective activity of society as a whole in a particular historical moment, rather 
than via embracing one or other of these two extremes. Through Ilyenkov, Lenin continues to 
speak to our own times. 
Key words: V.I. Lenin, E.V. Ilyenkov, Leninism, postmodernism, dialectics, materialism, 
philosophy, Europe
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Noting that 150 years have passed since Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s birth is in some 
regards simply to cite a number, although in many circles it is also typically taken 
to  constitute a ‘significant anniversary’, an occasion to revisit someone’s life and legacy. 
In order to  attempt the latter, and to discuss the significance of the 150th anniversary 
of  Lenin’s birth, it is, however, perhaps useful to begin by considering some other kinds 
of  numbers first. In 1991, Ukraine had 5,500 Lenin monuments of various kinds. Today, 
in 2020, there are only two Lenin statues left, both located in the Chernobyl nuclear 
exclusion zone. The removal, over the course of 30 years, of all of these statues and 
other monuments occurred in waves, much of it government directed and sanctioned, 
with the fastest wave of deliberate de-memorialization occurring after 2013 [Raining 
Lenins 2020]. This  rampage of the state sanctioned destruction of monuments obviously 
predated the more recent shift in Western countries to reconsider and remove memorials 
now associated with what are today considered morally reprehensible historical 
phenomena, be they the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, or the Southern Confederacy in the 
US. The  earlier wave of destruction of Lenin memorials also involved remarkably little 
in the way of deliberate relocation or reorientation. In Ukraine at least, these statutes and 
other memorials were not relocated to museums, where they could be recontextualized 
and discussed, but were simply first defaced and then physically obliterated.
Why is this phenomenon worth mentioning on the 150th anniversary of Lenin’s 
birth? Precisely because it underlines that any discussion of Lenin and his historical 
significance and legacy long ago ceased to be simple or easy. When dealing with and 
discussing Lenin today, any researcher or analyst has to deal with the Hegelian phenomena 
of the ‘three Lenins’. In order to discuss any notion of Lenin’s enduring significance or 
meaning in an anniversary setting, one has to therefore first clarify which Lenin one is 
discussing. In this article I shall attempt to do so, studying and recording, but also parsing 
away, both the ‘father and son’ to then discuss the ‘spirit’ or ‘Holy Ghost’ of Lenin in 
the 21st century. In attempting to arrive at this ‘spirit’, I will advocate an Ilyenkovian 
reading of Lenin (the Soviet philosopher Evald Ilyenkov) in order to determine both 
what most distinguishes Lenin’s philosophical thought from that of our own times, and 
why I would argue that such a core, or ‘spririt’, remains an essential reference point 
even today. To  preface this eventual conclusion, I argue that what remains ultimately 
relevant about Lenin is his insistence on the concept of the ideal in human history. This is 
a deeply unfashionable concept in the current post-modern world of ‘memory politics’. 
Without it  however, politics itself arguably loses its meaning, and the ideal consequently 
represents a concept to which human civilization itself needs to, at some stage, return. 
Such a conclusion does not pretend to define the ideal itself as somehow an uncontested 
or in any way fully resolved subject—modern politics itself traditionally arose from 
contested notions of the ideal—but it seeks to underline the fact that the ideal itself 
has been lost as a referent object in the majority of advanced societies, in favor of pure 
plurality. Any call to return to a world defined by the ideal, however, obviously also 
requires a conscious accounting of how the very notion of the ideal was itself warped and 
misinterpreted in the twentieth century, and a consideration of how and why a certain 
liberal vision of the ideal is now also being increasingly rejected by a growing number 
of societies in the 21st century [Kravtsev, Holmes 2020]. 
This article therefore begins by summarizing and parsing away, as a preliminary 
exercise, both the ‘empirical’ Lenin, embodied by his vast physical legacy of books, 
pamphlets and speeches on hundreds of topics, still well preserved today in multiple 
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editions, and the ‘mythological’ Lenin of ‘Leninism’, whose reification formed so  much 
of the institutional glue that held the Soviet Union together for the majority of its 
existence. If one were to argue for the overriding relevance of the ‘first’ Lenin, then he is 
‘merely’ a major historical actor, the equivalent to a Lincoln, Roosevelt or Churchill, of 
critical importance to the understanding of his own era, but not necessarily of longer-term 
significance. If one were, on the other hand, to privilege ‘Leninism’ as Lenin’s own chief 
legacy, this would be to acknowledge Lenin’s essential irrelevance today, on the 150th 
anniversary of his birth, given the demise of the main project associated with ‘Leninism’, 
the Soviet Union itself. If by contrast we wish to argue that there remains something 
of eternal relevance in Lenin’s thought, a ‘rational kernel within the mystical shell’ 
[Marx 1873 (1954), p. 20] on this, the anniversary of his birth, we have to first disaggregate 
those aspects and legacies which are unquestionably also important, but which are 
nonetheless not going to contribute to important debates another 150 years from now.
With regard to the ‘empirical’ Lenin, or as Hegel might put it, the ‘thing itself’; 
the man and his writings, the textual base remains by which to study and explain Lenin’s 
own worldview and opinions, and which, for historians, will always continue to attract 
attention and study. Although there are many other avenues where one could begin 
to consider Lenin’s thought and legacy, the 54 volumes of Lenin’s Collected Works, 
which (often unread) formerly used to occupy pride of place in countless Soviet offices 
and living rooms, remains a key starting point for many, and for historians this legacy 
will also remain permanently relevant. This physical legacy is above all important for 
stressing the manner in which Lenin’s own thinking evolved over time, for identifying 
the ‘wrong turns’ that he clearly made in his own lifetime, and to serve as a reminder that 
he was a human being and not a demigod; one just as prone to doubt, rage, self-delusion, 
and unbalanced reactions as the rest of us. Our consideration of Lenin’s actual method 
of thought, to which I return later, acquires all the greater significance precisely because 
it forms a separate category for analysis compared to Lenin’s own historically specific 
flaws, biases, strengths and weaknesses.
There is however also a second, and at one distinct stage removed, ‘Lenin’, 
namely the first major popularization of Lenin’s own thought, ‘Leninism’. This was 
the ideological canon created after Lenin’s death, and used as a continuous rhetorical 
reference point first within the Soviet Union, and then later in the Eastern Bloc as 
a  whole, for instrumental political purposes. ‘Leninism’ after 1924 was employed both to 
embalm Lenin himself, and to provide the intellectual justification for every subsequent 
twist and turn of Soviet domestic and foreign policy by party leaders in their day 
[Yurchak  2015; Yurchak 2017]. Critically, the creation of this canon also involved, and in 
fact depended upon, the manipulation, selective quotation, and even censorship of Lenin 
himself. Lenin’s ‘Testament’ from 1923 was not published inside the Soviet Union until 
1956, and an array of his other writings and policy interventions made during his own 
lifetime remained censored and unpublished until after the Soviet collapse [Lenin  1999]. 
This  ‘Leninism’, as a canon of writings and ideas owned, popularized and manipulated 
by the party, was, therefore, from the outset very deliberately different from the Lenin 
known to his closest and most intimate contemporaries.
On top of its deliberate selectivity towards Lenin’s actual thought and writings, 
‘Leninism’ for the majority of its existence also proved a remarkably malleable state 
doctrine, invoked alternatively to justify agricultural collectivization under Stalin, 
De-Stalinization under Khrushchev, ‘mature socialism’ under Brezhnev, or ‘glasnost 
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and perestroika’ under Gorbachev. Its core principle in the public consciousness for the 
majority of the Soviet Union’s existence nonetheless remained remarkably consistent 
over time. I would argue that ‘Leninism’, as popularly understood, represented an 
alternate form of rapid modernization for a backward society, whose final destination was 
the condition defined as ‘communism’. In this sense, despite outward changes in  form 
and emphasis, the central content of official, state sponsored ‘Leninism’, as late as 1987, 
remained remarkably similar, in many respects, to the definition first given by  Stalin 
in 1924 of the ‘Leninist’ formula of revolutionary modernization:
Leninism is a school of theory and practice which trains a special type of Party and state 
worker, creates a special Leninist style in work. What are the characteristic features of this 
style? What are its peculiarities? It has two specific features:
a) Russian revolutionary sweep and
b) American efficiency.
The style of Leninism consists in combining these two specific features in Party and state 
work[...]. American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognizes 
obstacles; which with its business-like perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which 
continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without 
which serious constructive work is inconceivable [Stalin 1924].
The Soviet Union, as the site of an alternate and utopian ‘Second America’, wherein 
the highest achievements of technology, resource exploitation, and modern industrial 
management techniques would be combined with levels of social justice unattainable 
in capitalist America itself, collapsed in 1991. The reasons for that collapse were 
multiple, they have been extensively studied, and they need no lengthy reiteration here. 
In essence though, the crisis and collapse of the Soviet system came about through a 
combination of economic stagnation, political anarchy, and moral bankruptcy. All three 
phenomena dealt massive blows to the official structure of ‘Leninism’. The revival (and 
deepening) by Gorbachev of De-Stalinization, first initiated by Khrushchev back in 
1956, led to  a  general lightening of censorship after 1985, and to further historical and 
archaeological revelations. These served to deliver a final and (as it turned out) fatal blow 
to Leninism’s claims to moral superiority over capitalism in the public consciousness 
[Shane 1995]. The economic impulse of perestroika itself, initially intended to trigger 
a ‘quickening’ (uskorenie) of the economy, with a final breakthrough to technological 
modernity, ended instead in chaos and financial insolvency, the results of which first 
became glaringly apparent in 1989, in the effective abandonment of the Soviet sphere 
of  influence in Eastern Europe [Miller 2016]. As these two trends played out, Gorbachev 
domestically also undermined the traditional role of the party, pursuing reforms after 
September 1988 that effectively sought to resolve the long-standing tension in party-
state relations by increasingly privileging state institutions whilst also attempting to 
decentralize power to the regions [Gleason 1990]. The consequence of the effective 
sidelining of the CPSU, as the ultimate social network binding the union together, 
was a constitutional crisis triggered by rising nationalism within the state institutions 
of  multiple union republics, and the dissolution of the union itself in December 1991. 
In the space of approximately six years, Leninism was effectively and comprehensively 
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destroyed by those who, at least initially, apparently sought most ardently to reform and 
maintain it [Walker 1993]. 
The fall of Lenin statues across Eastern Europe and many ex-Soviet states is, in this 
sense, the last and most obvious consequence of this increasingly socialized rejection 
of Leninism. The act of removal and eradication itself symbolizes an open rejection 
of the forms of modernity that Leninism ultimately produced, and the vision it was felt 
to embody—an articulation of the view, which became increasingly vocally expressed 
after 1989, that Leninism itself had proven a historical ‘dead end’ [Popov 2010; Brown 
2004]. It also very obviously represented an open contestation over public space and 
memory, in terms of past heroes and villains, and the triumph of a more ostensibly 
liberal and  pluralistic view of history, via local ‘memory politics’. As Dmitri Nikulin 
notes, when Enlightenment thinking underwent an increasingly general critique during 
the course of the late twentieth century, ‘memory replaced this dethroned conception 
of reason by becoming the predominant capacity to which one refers when one wants 
to explain a historical, political or social phenomenon [….] Memory thus becomes the 
vehicle for collective self-understanding, often prompted by a collectively shared trauma, 
which becomes the basis for producing a new history’ [Nikulin 2015, p. 5]. For many, 
the passing of a rigid ‘ideology’ was now naturally replaced by a highly competitive 
‘memory politics’, welcomed in many circles as a natural additional ingredient in the 
generation of the open society advocated by Western advisors for post-communist 
societies [Popper 1945 (2011)].
This Western discourse alternative to Leninism itself evolved from Karl Popper’s 
famous condemnation of ‘teleological historicism’ as the root philosophical source of all 
totalitarianism. Popper famously traced this philosophical current back through Marx 
and Hegel to, ultimately, Plato. If free markets were now seen as the only way to overall 
human prosperity, a free competition of ideas and symbols was now also deliberately 
encouraged to generate ‘post-modern’ politics, within which, it was hoped, anti-free 
market ideologies would never again be able to find sufficiently plausible purchase 
to  become entrenched. All larger meta-narratives to explain human life as the working 
through of a certain form of reason were to be discarded. Yesterday’s villain could now 
be plausibly reinvented and commodified as today’s hero and martyr, and yesterday’s 
hero could just as simply be recast as a villain; all opinions were now equal, and all 
enjoyed an equal and natural right to be heard, as mere commodities in a free marketplace 
of  ideas. The near-universal fall of Lenin monuments since 1991 was accompanied 
by the raising of statues and memorials to the terrorist Stepan Bandera in Ukraine, 
to  Estonians who served in the Waffen SS during the Second World War in  Estonia, 
and to the White Supreme Leader Admiral Kolchak in Russia. In Russia itself in fact, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 25 monuments have now also 
been raised to  the memory of Tsar Nicholas II [Masis 2017]. The very diversity of these 
phenomena is itself often upheld as a victory for the open society, even whilst many 
of the past figures currently being commemorated were ironically themselves merely 
supporters of  alternate varieties of totalitarian thought in their own day.
There is a further dual symbolic purpose in these acts of de-memorialization and 
revalorization. The first purpose, epitomized by the public defacement and often violent 
destruction of the Lenin monuments themselves, is a conscious desire both to shock, and 
to declare other versions of the past at least the equal, or even better, than the previous 
official account of history. The performative act itself is just as important as the content, 
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given that it is often held to represent liberation from a now socially discredited version 
of the past. In this context, private acts of defacement often involved deliberate acts 
of  subversion and humor, as well as more obvious threats and insults. There was also 
often a discernible and quite easily mapped political geography in relation to exactly how 
far public memory remained a contested subject; in Western Ukraine, which only became 
a part of the Soviet Union in 1939, all monuments to Lenin had already been removed 
as early as the autumn of 1991 [Gamboni 2013, p. 66]. The second purpose of  actual 
memorial destruction and removal however was to construct new modes of  public and 
collective memory, new sources of symbolic capital, and to redefine national identity. 
In  Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, the bust of Marx that once sat at the center of the 
city was famously replaced after independence by a statue of Tamerlane, the indigenous 
14th century Uzbek warlord [Zarkar 2015]. In Russia, President Boris Yeltsin, who as 
a  Soviet official had earlier presided over the physical destruction of the historic Ipatiev 
house where the Romanov family were killed, led efforts during 1998 to return the 
Romanov family remains to St. Petersburg, and in the process to grant them a formal 
Russian Orthodox burial. Tellingly, Yeltsin’s 1998 initiative came two years after he 
had also announced a yearlong competition to produce a new Russian ‘national idea’, 
a  competition which famously ended, despite considerable financial incentives, without 
a winner or an answer [Forest, Johnson 2002, p. 530].
Important as these symbolic public acts are to tracing and mapping the remarkable 
overthrow of Leninism as a governing state idea after 1991, they have less to tell us  about 
the core of Lenin’s own thinking and beliefs. They arguably remain the equivalent of the 
shadows projected onto the wall in Plato’s allegory of the cave; if one were to study 
Lenin’s potential relevance only through the prism of the rise and fall of Leninism as 
a symbolic public imaginary, one would stand in danger of repeating the world view 
of the prisoners in that famous cave, mistaking the flickering shadows on the wall for 
the reality outside the cave. Although Leninism superficially embodied the physical 
realization of Lenin’s ideas and beliefs for much of the 20th century, and although 
these shadows were artfully manipulated by several members of the cave collective 
during that time, the phenomena of Leninism and its passing has much less to tell us 
about Lenin’s own thinking, and about the rational core of the Leninist ideal, which 
still matters today. Leninism was unquestionably the prevailing and dominant social 
manifestation of those who declared themselves followers of Lenin in the 20th century. 
It was certainly not, however, identical with the philosophical essence of Lenin’s actual 
thought. The vanishing of certain shadows on the cave wall consequently does not mean 
that the  inhabitants of the cave have also finally freed themselves, and now wander 
naturally at liberty beyond the confines of the cave itself.
The first Marxist philosopher in the Soviet Union who, while Leninism still 
existed, attempted to point out the growing gap between Leninism as it had come to be 
popularly and publicly interpreted, and the core philosophical content of Lenin’s own 
ideas and thought, was the tragic figure of Evald Ilyenkov (1924–1979). Ilyenkov’s 
philosophical output in the 1950s and 1960s was heavily shaped by the Khrushchevite 
thaw of De-Stalinization. His growing conflicts with the leaders of the official academic 
school of Diamat (Dialectical Materialism) during that time led him to be increasingly 
ostracized and marginalized within the Soviet academic establishment, a condition 
which undoubtedly contributed to his taking his own life in 1979. A recurring note 
in  Ilyenkov’s own thinking and writing was an attempted return to Lenin—a consistent 
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effort to excavate the core philosophical principles that had guided Lenin himself during 
his own lifetime, separate from the scaffolding and architecture of Leninism that had 
been erected after Lenin’s death. This was in itself a response to the neopositivism which 
Ilyenkov felt increasingly characterized official Diamat in his own day. 
During Ilyenkov’s lifetime, the official definition of communism—the ‘ideal’ 
in Soviet thought—was expressed in increasingly concrete, positivist, and specific 
material terms. This flowed naturally from the Stalinist interpretation of Leninism as 
American-style modernization with a Russian (revolutionary) twist and found perhaps 
its final and highest public expression in the (in)famously utopian materialism of the 
1961 communist party program [Titov 2009]. This program notoriously proclaimed that 
by 1981, the ‘material and technical base’ of communism would be largely achieved, 
and it set in stone specific concrete tasks for each decade, milestones which the Soviet 
Union then infamously failed to meet. Such tasks included the goal that, by 1970, ‘hard 
physical work will disappear’, that by that stage the USSR would also have the shortest 
working day in the world, while by 1980 the abundance of goods would be such that 
their distribution could begin to occur on the basis of needs. Shops and factories would 
become increasingly automated, the real income per head of the population was forecast 
to grow by 250 percent in 20 years, housing was to become rent-free, public catering 
would replace domestic cooking within 10–15 years, public transport would be free by 
the end of the second decade, and the housing problem itself would be generally resolved 
[The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1961]. The 1961 program 
represented the high tide of a concrete, highly empirical vision of what communism 
would mean, with individual production targets in almost every imaginable material 
category being generated. As before, the final basic measure of comparison here, by 
which communism was to be judged to have been finally accomplished, remained the 
US, which the Soviet Union, in Khrushchev’s famous catchphrase, was destined to ‘catch 
up [with] and overtake’. This highly concrete and specific vision was not coincidentally 
followed by widespread disillusion and disengagement, as everyday reality failed to meet 
the often abstract targets set by the program. Disillusionment was bred not only by the 
obvious failure to ‘catch up and overtake’ the US, but by the catastrophic environmental 
damage inflicted as a consequence of the developmental ideology itself. In the 25 years 
which followed the publication of the program, the Aral Sea in Central Asia became 
a  desert, the Chernobyl disaster permanently contaminated significant areas of Ukraine 
and Belarus with nuclear fallout, and widespread air and water pollution became endemic 
in many cities across Russia, from Moscow to Vladivostok, vastly increasing the rate 
of  both birth defects and premature deaths [Peterson 2019].
The vision of communism espoused in the 1961 program, however, reflected 
one of the central tenets of official Diamat; the binary distinction between matter and 
consciousness. In official Diamat, matter itself formed the superstructure that shaped 
reality; consciousness was only a response, an individualized subjective neurological 
registration of an externally objective reality. Reducing the conceptualization of the ideal 
(in this case, ‘communism’) to a chemical response in the brain produced by external 
stimuli transformed the brain itself into a ‘programmable’ organ, for which the prime 
prerequisite naturally became these external material conditions. This increasingly 
strong strain of scientism led one interviewer, decades later, to ask Sergei Mareev 
(1941–2019), a student of Ilyenkov’s and a major philosopher in his own right, whether 
the ‘secret’ ideology of the Soviet Union had not in fact become scientism rather than 
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Marxism-Leninism. Mareev responded that positivism did probably verge on becoming 
the ‘official world view’ of the late Soviet epoch, something that had provoked growing 
anti-scientism amongst Ilyenkov’s humanistically-minded philosophical colleagues, 
though he opined that the positivist trend at the time was stronger in Diamat than Istmat 
(historical materialism), given that the latter certainly recognized that consciousness 
had a social character. For Ilyenkov himself, Mareev also speculated that this split 
between scientism and anti-scientific world views represented a false opposition; what 
in Ilyenkov’s view was critical was not the new science of cybernetics itself for example, 
but the over-reliance on this as:
the ideal and as the means for solving all problems. It is precisely from this that positivism 
and scientism grows. But at the other extreme, where solutions to all problems are sought 
in religion, morality and moralism, and most commonly, pure verbiage—these were not for 
Ilyenkov. He was certainly far from this kind of ‘humanism’[...] he was not pleased by all the 
talk about ‘humanism’, ‘socialism with a human face’, and so on because he knew well what 
would follow. And what followed is what we have now—the same bureaucracy but without 
a  human face [Levant, Oittinen 2014, pp. 91–94].
For our present purposes, what is significant about Ilyenkov’s contribution, given 
the general philosophical trends in his own lifetime, is his attempt to recover a more 
creative form of thinking and a conceptualization of the ideal via a return to Lenin. 
In this endeavor, Ilyenkov found a useful historical parallel for his own time which 
he underlined in his last book, the posthumously published Leninist Dialectics and the 
Metaphysics of Positivism. The historical parallel here was the debate that had exploded 
after 1908 between Lenin and another leading thinker in the Bolshevik party at the time, 
Alexander Bogdanov. Bogdanov’s vision of socialism had just been outlined in populist 
style in his 1908 science fiction novel Red Star, which used the then-fashionable parable 
of life on Mars to investigate the future nature of scientific socialism. 
On Mars, the literal ‘Red Planet’ of the novel, Martian life by 1905, the year 
of  the novel’s setting, had been re-ordered by the latest scientific discoveries to remove 
all sources of conflict and distress. The state had disappeared, as had private property, 
labor had been reduced to a few hours a day through the wonders of automation, and 
the distress of death itself had been traduced by freely available voluntary euthanasia. 
Society had entered a state of complete equilibrium, which the novel portrays as the 
natural outcome of socialism’s accomplishments. The only problem that remained was 
the growing exhaustion of Mars’s own natural resources, which appeared to require 
a  Martian invasion of Earth, colonization, and the extermination of the still unfortunately 
far less advanced human race [Ilyenkov 1982, pp. 58–66]. This tragic outcome is avoided 
in the novel by the intervention of love between a Martian and an Earthman, which results 
in the invasion being delayed in order to give more time for the coming social revolution 
on Earth to occur. Ilyenkov is particularly scathing of two aspects of the novel that he 
clearly read as characteristic of the emerging positivist trends and of the visions of the 
ideal in general in his own day. The first is the assumption made in the novel that socialism 
equates to equilibrium—that advanced socialism produces a society, as on Mars, without 
internal conflicts or contradictions of any kind, where production is simply and efficiently 
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conducted and encoded using ‘gigantic calculating machines’ [Ilyenkov 1982, p. 59]. 
The second is Bogdanov’s need to insert love into the novel, as the counterbalance that 
eventually somehow saves humanity. As Ilyenkov ironized of this plot device:
When fetishized science and scientific thinking lead to immoral conclusions [...] then the 
scientist sheds a tear, and begins to seek salvation in abstract and empty, but ‘humane’ 
ideals, placating his romantic but, alas, absolutely barren nobility [Ilyenkov 1982, p. 66]. 
Ilyenkov’s criticism of Bogdanov’s thought here clearly reflected his own opposition 
to what he saw as the two emerging trends in philosophy. It is fair to surmise that he saw 
in Bogdanov the embodiment of the two recurring philosophical extremes of subjective 
idealism, extremes which portrayed the ideal either in rigid official Diamat terms 
of  purely material technocratic modernization, or in its natural opposite—subjective 
and abstract humanistic mysticism, love, morality, or religion. This particular opposition 
was reflected in the novel’s own stark portrayal of the differences between life on Mars 
and life on Earth, with a rigid teleological arc of development between the two societies, 
and love, or emotion, portrayed as the only short-term mediating force. Given these 
parallels, it is also no coincidence that Ilyenkov saw in Lenin, Bogdanov’s philosophical 
and political opponent at the time, a possible intellectual rescue and route out of what 
Ilyenkov himself perceived as this increasingly threatening intellectual dead end. 
Bogdanov’s views and writings famously stirred in Lenin a furious polemical 
response, the 1908 text Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, but also triggered in  him 
a  longer-term interest in the roots of dialectics in philosophy in general, which led Lenin, 
during the First World War, to re-acquaint himself with the Ancient Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus, with Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and finally with Hegel’s Science of  Logic. 
In  his  last written work, Ilyenkov sought both to rescue Lenin’s 1908 work and to 
underline the philosophical continuity of Lenin’s development after that date, noting that 
the content and significance of this highly polemical work is interpreted too narrowly and 
one-sidedly, and consequently incorrectly. And not only by open enemies of revolutionary 
Marxism, but also by some of its ‘friends’ [Ilyenkov 1982, p. 3].
For Ilyenkov, Lenin was a key ally in Ilyenkov’s understanding of the ideal, which 
was dialectical. The ‘ideal’ was neither a chemical and purely individual reaction in the 
human brain to external stimuli, nor was it the product of abstracting entirely from external 
reality to an individual and subjective emotional or spiritual position on some separate 
plane (the role now increasingly assigned to ‘memory’). It was, rather, a product of social 
activity, and more than that, of society as a whole in a particular historical epoch:
The real materialist solution to the problem in its present formulation [...] was found as 
we know by Marx, who ‘had in mind’ an entirely real process, specifically inherent to 
human life activity: the process by which the material life activity of social man begins 
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to produce not only a material but also an ideal product, begins to produce the act  
of idealization of reality [...] and then, having arisen, the ‘ideal’ becomes a critical component  
of the material life-activity of social man, and then begins the opposite process—the process 
of the materialization (objectification, reification, ‘incarnation’) of the ideal.
These two actually opposite processes eventually lock into more or less pronounced cycles, 
and the end of one process becomes the beginning of the other, opposite one, which leads 
in the end to the motion of a spiral shape, with all its ensuring dialectical consequences 
(Ilyenkov “Dialectics of the Ideal” in [Levant, Oittinen 2014, p. 36]).
Lenin’s own articulation of this method of thinking reached perhaps its most 
condensed form in his wartime Philosophical Notebooks but was, Ilyenkov argued, 
a  natural extension and further development of his initial engagement with Bogdanov in 
1908 over the nature of physical reality. Lenin drew from Heraclitus that human history 
was not a teleological arc, leading from emotional chaos and inequality to a  Martian 
system of perfect equilibrium without contradictions, but in the true dialectical 
materialist worldview was a constant conflict of continuously emerging and submerging 
contradictions. The same distinction led Lenin to debate fiercely with Bukharin and 
Kautsky when both men, in his eyes, seemed to propose, at different times, and in their 
own ways, the existence of a frictionless route to socialism. As Heraclitus himself had 
put it, in what Lenin at the time praised as ‘a very good exposition of the principles 
of  dialectical materialism’:
The world, an entity out of everything, was created by none of the gods or men, but was, 
is, and will be eternally living fire, regularly becoming ignited and regularly becoming 
extinguished [Lenin 1972, pp. 344, 347].
Such a perception led Lenin naturally to embrace the need for revolution 
in Russia in 1917 as a necessary social act, a logical step in an ongoing process. Although 
he  was a  supporter as early as 1918 of the importation of American-style management 
techniques, specifically Taylorism, as a means to assist Russia through the catastrophic 
economic collapse created by war and the revolution itself, Lenin’s final writings 
on the nature of the Soviet state were also much more modest, without any of the rhetoric 
around catching up and surpassing America that later became one of the central tenets 
of  ‘Leninism’. Lenin’s last writings spoke instead to the importance of now cultivating 
an authentically new and different human culture: 
If a definite level of culture is required for the building of socialism (although nobody can say 
just what that definite ‘level of culture’ is, for it differs in every Western European country), 
why cannot we began by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture  
in a revolutionary way, and then, with the aid of the workers’ and peasants’ government and 
Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations?
You say that civilization is necessary for the building of socialism. Very good. But why could 
we not first create such prerequisites of civilization in our country by the expulsion of the 
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landowners and the Russian capitalists, and then start moving toward socialism? Where, 
in what books, have you read that such variations of the customary historical sequence  
of events are impermissible or impossible?
Napoleon, I think, wrote: ‘On s’engage et puis ... on voit.’ Rendered freely this means: ‘First 
engage in a serious battle and then see what happens.’ Well, we did first engage in a serious 
battle in October 1917, and then saw such details of development (from the standpoint 
of  world history they were certainly details) as the Brest peace, the New Economic Policy, 
and so forth. And now there can be no doubt that in the main we have been victorious 
[Lenin  1965, pp. 478–480].
Lenin’s definition here of the politics of the ideal as, above all, a collective social 
activity, rather than an abstract exercise in personal mental enlightenment, undoubtedly 
terrifies many today, in the wake of a century of grand social experiments that produced 
hecatombs of intended and unintended dead in their wake. The rejection of political meta-
narratives, and the rise of a highly individualized and decentralized ‘memory politics’ 
as the preferred alternative of social organization in most advanced modern societies is 
undoubtedly the conjoined product of both the social trauma of such earlier collective 
experiences and their conscious intellectual rejection by figures like Karl Popper—the 
biases of which continue to pervade analytic philosophy in Western academia today. 
The ‘research project’ that Lenin foresaw in his Philosophical Notebooks, however, 
envisioned avenues of investigation which went beyond mere killing fields of terror 
and destruction. They included developing ‘fields of knowledge from which the theory 
of knowledge and dialectics should be built’, including psychology, the study of 
language, the history of cognition in general, and the mental development of the child 
[Lenin  1972,  p. 351]. Lenin never lived to see this program implemented, but during 
the Soviet era various activists within Soviet academic life, including Lev Vygotsky 
and Ilyenkov himself, undertook substantial practical work in these directions. Such 
avenues of activity were symbolized, for example, by Ilyenkov’s work with the disabled 
(blind-deaf children), which in the 1970s saw some of the most socially disadvantaged in 
society for the first time enter and successfully graduate from Moscow State University. 
Ilyenkov’s predominant intellectual concern was what he perceived as the rising 
tide of positivism, and a related crude materialism which was being increasingly used 
to define both socialism and the ultimate state of communism. He would perhaps be 
surprised, had he lived longer, to witness, paraphrasing Lenin, how far the stick has now 
been ‘bent back the other way.’ In June 2020, for example, Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban proposed a new and entirely subjective idealist metric for Hungarian 
history—the Trianon (a reference to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon). Hungarian history in 
this narrative had enjoyed four hundred years of independence (four Trianons), followed 
by a calvary of humiliation and suffering, before renewed independence, which led to 
the present moment, when the modern Hungarian continues to see the world ‘through 
the eyes of St. Stephen [the first king of Hungary in the 11th century]’ [Orban 2020]. 
In Poland, in November 2019, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the governing Law and 
Justice (PiS) party, likewise declared the Church to be the only common referent object 
in contemporary Poland when it came to values, while his party declared their goal 
and mission as being to ‘re-Christianize’ Europe. Evangelicals and public intellectuals 
in both Europe and the US also began producing books praising the end of the ‘postwar 
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consensus’ after the Second World War, and endorsing the rise of nationalism, faith, 
and an end to ‘universalizing’ principles of law, gender, migrants, and human rights 
[Reno 2019; Hazony 2018]. To explain this kind of outcome requires acknowledging the 
contribution made by dissidents other than Ilyenkov after 1979.
The dissidents who first provided the intellectual narrative that became dominant 
during the last decade of Soviet socialism in Europe explicitly rejected what they 
increasingly saw as a utopian project to change human nature itself. Their dominant 
articulated desire was to create ‘open societies’ capable of ‘normal political life’, 
in  a manner which they themselves idealized, already existed in Western Europe and 
the US. In Germany, Jūrgen Habermas welcomed ‘the lack of ideas that are either 
innovative or oriented towards the future’ after 1989, whilst Adam Michnik in Poland 
also longed for ‘an anti-utopian revolution, because utopias lead to the guillotine and 
the gulag’ [Krastev, Holmes 2020, p. 24]. In the 1990s, however, the natural corollary 
of Michnik’s own belief in ‘normality’—that Poland needed to move forward without 
vengeance or vendettas rooted in the past—also incidentally led him to increasingly 
enter the crosshairs of the Polish political right, who, by contrast, longed to complete 
an ‘authentic’ revolution by purging from public life past employees of the socialist 
system. In general, the postmodern revolution that East European intellectuals saw 
themselves as enacting in 1989 led eventually to public disillusionment, and to the 
rise of new, more nationalist and populist ideologies, which offered an alternate 
mobilizational narrative for explaining the course of recent history. These populist 
narratives were themselves devoid of any rich semiotic content, resting instead mostly 
on thinly grounded myths of primordial nationalism, religion, race, and identity politics. 
They were however the natural stepchildren of the anti-utopian turn that had occurred 
in 1989, with the legal norm hegemony imposed by the EU now even being equated, 
in  many of these new narratives, with the humiliations of the earlier Soviet ‘totalitarian’ 
experience. The  roots of the intellectually impoverished illiberalism currently shaping 
Central Europe therefore unquestionably lie, as Kravtsev and Holmes have recently 
argued, in  ‘the intellectual poverty of the 1989 revolutions, undertaken in the name 
of  normality’ [Krastev, Holmes 2020, p. 70]. Being themselves incapable of creating 
any form of coherent resolution, founded in subjective idealism, and perpetuated 
instead by ongoing social division, these movements dramatically highlight the inability 
of history to end, and the need to return instead to a politics founded in debate around 
the content of a universal ideal. 
That ‘memory politics’ cannot fill the gap created by the abandonment of political 
meta-narratives is now obvious, in a world where memory itself is now increasingly 
weaponized and used purely as political ammunition in the hands of authoritarians. 
It therefore remains difficult to see another way of collectively moving forward other 
than to return to a political form of debate that openly discusses the form and nature 
of a universal ideal. Such an ideal is defined not by nationalism or by race, but by the 
distinct nature of humanity itself compared to all other animals, a unique being, whose 
uniqueness consists precisely in the fact that:
the ‘ideal’ exists only in man. Outside him and beyond him there can be nothing ‘ideal’. Man, 
however, is to be understood not as one individual with a brain [or as one nation—AM],  
but as a real ensemble of real people collectively realizing their specific human life-activity, 
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as the ‘ensemble of all social relations’ arising between people around one common task, 
around the process of the social production of their life (Ilyenkov “Dialectics of the Ideal” 
in [Levant, Oittinen 2014, p. 77]).
To return to a politics that engages with the ‘ensemble of all social relations’ and 
to debate around the ideal form of ‘social production’ requires a return to the politics 
of  Lenin. We are not obliged by this course to return to the paths Lenin himself personally 
followed or advocated, or to agree with the often purely contingent solutions that he 
reached in his own day as either viable or appropriate recipes for our own era. But to 
escape the dead end of postmodernism, and its current bastard stepchild, the era of ‘post-
truth’ politics, requires a collective return to engaging with the dialectics of the ideal.
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В 150-летнюю годовщину рождения В.И. Ленина в академическом сообществе 
поднимается вопрос об оставленном историческом наследии основателя больше-
вистской партии. Проводя грань между Лениным-человеком и почти 70-летним 
культом почитания его памяти, с одной стороны, и его методом и образом мыш-
ления, с другой, в статье предпринимается попытка оценить значение фигуры 
В.И. Ленина для сегодняшней Европы. Основу данного исследования составляет 
анализ основных идей В.И. Ленина в интерпретации Э.В. Ильенкова.
В каком-то смысле нынешняя европейская политика по-прежнему остается 
побочным продуктом отрицания ленинизма после 1989 г., а именно ленинизма, ко-
торый с 1924 г. эволюционировал в социологическую теорию, предполагающую на-
бор практических мер для осуществления ускоренной модернизации в отстающих 
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обществах. Отрицание ленинизма как альтернативной формы модерна в странах 
Центрально-Восточной Европы привело к его замещению постмодернистской по-
литикой памяти, которая, хоть и ускорила развитие конкурентной политической 
культуры, все же оказалась зацикленной преимущественно на вопросах культур-
ных и религиозных различий, нередко перерождаясь в радикальный этнический 
национализм.
Об этой опасности предупреждал советской философ Э.В. Ильенков, ко-
торый на основе переосмысления диалектики идеального, впервые изученной 
К. Марксом и В.И. Лениным, попытался противостоять подъему неопозитивист-
ского мышления 1960–1970-х гг. Выявив скрытую угрозу в механистическом мате-
риализме, он не менее открыто противостоял субъективному «социализму с чело-
веческим лицом» и прочим идеалистическим течениям, развившимся как отклик 
на неопозитивистскую риторику советской социальной жизни. И в этом он, без-
условно, разделял позицию В.И. Ленина, считавшего, что истинное определение 
идеального возможно лишь в конкретный исторический момент и лишь в резуль-
тате сплоченных коллективных усилий общества, а не через принятие какой-либо 
из вышеобозначенных крайностей. Таким образом, Э.В. Ильенкова в определен-
ном смысле можно считать современным проводником ленинских идей.
Ключевые слова: В.И. Ленин, Э.В. Ильенков, ленинизм, постмодернизм, диалек-
тика, материализм, философия, Европа
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